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Article 3

POLICE INTERROGATION: WARNINGS AND WAIVERS DO WE GO FROM HERE?

WHERE

Henry B. Rothblatt* and Robert M. Pitler**
Our attitude toward crime reflects our view of the value of the individual in society. In our deepest democratic and national commitments,
we are a society of individuals. It is for the protection of individuals and of
society that one who is accused of crime is deemed innocent until proved
guilty and is afforded all the substantive and procedural legal safeguards.
In protecting him, we protect ourselves. In a sense the entire system of
criminal jurisprudence is "symbolic," since every part of it stands for
something more than itself, namely, the preservation of the worth of each
individual in a society of individuals. If we are to be true to our heritage
at the same time that we struggle with the problems which beset us, we
must deter not only crime, but also the debasement of the individual.
I. Introduction
The indigent, illiterate, and the slow-witted in our midst, who are unaware of or ill-equipped to assert their rights constitute a large number
of those suspected, arrested, and interrogated concerning criminal activity.2
In finding certain police procedures frequently employed against these
groups inherently coercive, and in holding that such procedures bring into play
"one of our Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not
be compelled to incriminate himself,"' the Supreme Court has implemented
"a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 4 Concerned with the preservation of human dignity and the promotion of equal justice under law during police
interrogation regardless of whether the suspect be affluent, educated, and wellinformed, or indigent, poorly schooled, and ignorant, the Court has proclaimed:
[W]hatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the
time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to
insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that
point in time. 5
* Member, California Bar, New York Bar; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School, 1938; LL.M.,
Brooklyn Law School, 1939; Partner, Rothblatt & Rothblatt, New York City. A practicing
criminal lawyer, Mr. Rothblatt is the author of numerous books and articles on criminal
procedure.

** LL.B., Brooklyn Law School, 1966; W. W. Cook Research Fellow, University of

Michigan Law School.
1 Bazelon, Law, Morality and Civil Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
2

13, 28 (1964).

See BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (1951); A SPECAL CoMM.
Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID

OF THE

AND DEFENDER ASS'N, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AccusED 80, 134-35 (1959). In Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court was careful to point out that Miranda
was an indigent Mexican who was seriously disturbed with pronounced sexual fantasies.
Stewart is described as an indigent Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade.
Id. at 457.
3 Id. at 457-58.
4 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). In State v. Naglee, 44 N.J. 209,
207 A.2d 689 (1965), the accused was a police officer, causing the New Jersey Supreme
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These principles were applied recently in four cases concerning police interrogation in which the Supreme Court implemented the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment's right-to-counsel
rationale of Escobedo v. Illinois.6 The facts of three of these cases follow.
A. Miranda v. Arizona7
Ernesto Miranda was arrested, removed from his home, and taken to a
police station where he was identified by the complaining witness as her kidnapper
and rapist. The police then proceeded to question him in an "interrogation
room." After two hours the officers returned with a written confession signed
by Miranda. At the beginning of this confession, a paragraph read "that the
confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and
'with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make
may be used against me.' ""
B. Vignera v. New York
Michael Vignera was taken into custody in connection with a three-day-old
robbery and removed to a detective headquarters. He was then taken to a second
squad room where, in response to questioning, Vignera orally admitted the
robbery. While at the second site he was identified by two eyewitnesses as the
robber. He was then formally arrested and removed to a third station, where
an assistant district attorney questioned him further in the presence of a stenographer, who recorded the questions and Vignera's responses.
C. Westover v. United States
Carl Westover was arrested by police as a suspect in two local robberies.
He was taken to the police station; placed in a lineup; and two hours after
the initial arrest, booked. The police questioned Westover on the night of his
arrest, but he denied any criminal activity. The next morning local officials
continued the questioning. At about noon, in response to a Federal Bureau of
Investigation report that Westover was wanted in connection with two bank
Court to write: "Unlike most suspects, the defendants here were intimately associated with
law enforcement and it would be unreasonable to assume that they were not aware of their
rights in this situation." Id. at 222, 207 A.2d at 696. Naglee could not be decided the same
way under Miranda, and the mere fact that a suspect is a police officer does not excuse the
warning's not being given. The Naglee result followed where the suspect was a "professional criminal." See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 270 Minn. 333, 133 N.W.2d 828 "(1965); Bean
v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251 (1965) (per curiam); Seymour v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St.
25, 208 N.E.2d 922 (1965). Since Miranda, these cases no longer retain any vitality.
6 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Although some commentators and judges claim to be astonished
by this shift in approach, the effective assistance of counsel required by Escobedo was merely
a prophylactic device to insulate a suspect's absolute right not to be compelled to incriminate
himself. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 5, at 469. See also Herman, The Supreme Court
and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449, 489 (1964); oral argument
of William A. Norris for Roy Stewart in MEDALIE, FROM Escobedo TO Miranda: THE ANATOMY OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION 182 (1966). For an excellent historical refutation
of the minority position in Miranda, see Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some
Comments on the New Fifth Amendment and the Old Voluntariness Test, 65 MICH. L. Rv.
59 (1966).
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The four cases, Miranda v. Arizona, Westover v. United States,
California v. Stewart, and Vignera v. New York, were all decided under the title Miranda
v. Arizona.
8 Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 7, at 492.
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robberies in California, the local police informed the F.B.I. that they could
question the suspect. Three agents then commenced their interrogation in an
"interview room"; prior to being questioned Westover was, however, warned
that "he did not have to make a statement, that any statement he made could
be used against him, and that he had the right to see an attorney."9 Approximately two and one-half hours later, Westover signed two separate confessions,
one for each of the bank robberies. Subsequently he was tried in federal court
and convicted of both California crimes.
II. The Court's Decision: The Warning Requirement
In each of these cases the suspect was deprived of his freedom and placed
in surroundings that rendered it difficult for him to avoid being questioned and
incriminating himself. The Supreme Court found each of these situations "inherently coercive" and held that the right not to be compelled to incriminate
oneself could best be vouchsafed if prior to any questioning the police were required to give each defendant the following four-part warning:
1. that he has the right to remain silent;'"

2. that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; 1
3. that he has the right to the presence of an attorney;" and
4. that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires."
This four-pronged warning is a prerequisite to any custodial questioning by
the police, and the right to the warning accrues when a person is placed in custody
or deprived of his freedom of movement in any significant way. 4 Although
after these warnings have been given, the suspect may knowingly, rationally, and
intelligently waive his rights, if the police fail to give these warnings, or if they
do warn him but he does not effectively waive his rights, any evidence derived
"as a result of" the interrogation cannot be used against him." In addition to
this standard warning, the suspect should also be informed of the nature of the
crime involved, since the seriousness of the offense is relevant in determining
whether or not to speak. Without that knowledge it is doubtful that the suspect
could effectively waive his rights.
III. Appointment of Counsel
Miranda requires that an impecunious suspect be advised of his right to
the appointment of counsel and to have that counsel present during any inter9 Id. at 495.
10 Id. at 468.
11 Id. at 469.
12 Id. at 471.
13 Id. at 473.
14 Id. at 478-79. The term "significant" appears to drop out after it is initially mentioned, id. at 444, in the majority opinion. The Court talks about an individual being
"deprived of his freedom of action in any way." Id. at 477. (Emphasis added.)
15 Id. at 479.
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rogation. 6 The American Law Institute in its Model Code of Pre-Arraigment
Procedure found there was no affirmative duty on the part of the state in its
system of criminal justice to relieve the consequences of "poverty, ignorance and
psychological deprivation."'" Thus, it found no social or moral obligation to
appoint counsel for the indigent prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings.' The Model Code did provide, however, that retained counsel would
be permitted to be present during interrogation even though a suspect who was
not fortunate enough to have family, money, or sophistication "would have to
go it alone." 9
Does the Government have any duty to the indigent in the administration
of criminal justice? The Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Criminal Justice eloquently set forth the answer:
The obligation of government in the criminal cases rests on wholly different
considerations and reflects principles of much more limited application.
The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which this Report
is concerned arise in a process initiated by government for the achievement
of basic governmental purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has as one
of its consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the persons
proceeded against. . . . When government chooses to exert its powers in
the criminal area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking reasonable measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just administration of the law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While government
may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may properly
be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of
justice.20 (Second emphasis added:)
Perhaps if the state were a neutral rather than an adversary there would
be no such duty owed the indigent. Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit went to the heart of the
matter when he wrote that
police detention and interrogation are not "neutral" state acts. Their
primary effect, unless counsel is provided, is to elicit damaging admissions
from suspects ....
If the state subjects all suspects to detention and interrogation, it is only a pretense of "neutrality" to permit those able to retain
counsel to protect their rights effectively while refusing to provide equal
protection to the poor and inexperienced. 21
At least one jurist has interpreted the most persuasive plea for the appointment of counsel in the police station as requiring a rule prohibiting the
16
17

Id. at 472-73.
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT

PROCEDURE

§ 5.01, comment 1(d) (Tent. Draft

No. 1,
18
19
20
Justice

1966).
Ibid.
See id. § 5.07 and § 5.07, comment 2(d).
U.S. Att'y Gen.'s Comm., Report on Poverty & the Administration of Federal Criminal
9 (1963).

21

Letter of Judge David Bazelon to Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, re-

printed in Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind? - The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 Ky. L.J.

464, 487 (1966).
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assistance of counsel for the affluent and sophisticated if counsel were not ap
pointed for the indigent and ignorant as well.22 Such reasoning according to that
critic collides with the general (arbitrary seems more appropriate) rule that even
"upon nonjudicial contact with officials, no man who is the target of a criminal
proceeding can be denied the right to have advice of counsel, actually produced."'2 It seems clear, however, that the proponent of assigned counsel was
operating on the premise that, once procedural rights are achieved for the rich
man, the "equality norm" exerts pressure to provide all with the same rights2

But equality in the administration of criminal justice cannot be achieved by
reducing the rights of the most fortunately endowed suspects to the level of the
least fortunate. It would be a perversion of the constitutional scheme - not to
mention a denial of due process of law - to deny retained counsel's access to
his client solely because another suspect similarly situated has no attorney. Is
it any the less a perversion for the state to take no affirmative action to insure
that this inequality does not prevail? It is, of course, most disturbing to deny
access to retained counsel in order to "promote equality," but is there any basis
for complacency when the very person who is most in need of assistance cannot
obtain it because he does not know or cannot afford to do so?2"
The position of the American Law Institute was properly put to rest when
the Supreme Court in Miranda indicated that "denial of counsel to the indigent
at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford
one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation
in Gideon v. Wainwright... and Douglas v. California ....

...

"26

(Emphasis

added.)
Under Miranda it is essential that the suspect be advised that counsel will
be appointed if he cannot afford to retain one. In People v. Witensk T two teenaged defendants were told by a justice of the peace that if they requested he
22

Breitel, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1966

UTAH

L.

REV. 1, 9,

commenting on

Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (1965).
23 Id. at 9. The author calls the rule "long standing," a somewhat surprising statement in light of the fact that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which gave constitutional validity to the rule was decided in 1964 and People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148,
193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), the New York case that was relied on in
Escobedo, was decided in 1963.
24 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 19 (1964).

25 It was in this spirit that Professor Kamisar reached the so-called dryly logical extreme.
In his commentary on the Bazelon-Katzenbach exchange, Kamisar isolated the issues:
The issue is not whether poverty, ignorance or instability should be a substantive
defense against criminal liability but whether these factors should be permitted to
inhibit the proper and effective assertion of procedural rights once the criminal
process has begun. The issue is not whether we should give the poor and ignorant
so many points because they are poor and ignorant, but whether, because they
suffer from these deficiencies, we should deprive them of rights and privileges they
are entitled to in the abstract. Presumably these rights and privileges manifest goals
and policies transcending the pursuit of alleged criminals.
The issue is not whether the government should ignore crime caused by poverty
and ignorance, but whether with respect to the assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination or the right to counsel or the protection against unreasonable
search and seizure, the government should exploit the influences of poverty or
ignorance- or seek to minimize them. The issue is whether, once the administration of criminal justice has begun, the government "should take the country as
it is." Kamisar, supra note 21, at 472.
26 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966).
27 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965).
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would contact their chosen attorney anywhere in the jurisdiction. This statement
implied that the defendants had a right to counsel only if they supplied him.
In reversing the conviction, the New York Court of Appeals discussed the standard
warning and went on to call for more than "a mere formulistic recital"2 of
legal language. Similarly the warning given to Carl Westover by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation would be insufficient, since the agents only informed
him that he had the right to see an attorney, while failing to advise him of his
right to assigned counsel.29
A. Custodial Interrogation
The term "in custody," which gives rise to the necessity for a warning,
at least encompasses detention in a police station, so there should be little difficulty
in determining when a suspect is "in custody." The companion phrase, "or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," must await
further definition by the courts. Three situations come to mind: (1) home
interrogation; (2) street interrogation (stop and frisk); and (3) police car
interrogation.
1. Home Interrogation
In dealing with interrogation in a suspect's home, the recent New York
case of People v. Allen"0 is illuminating. Police officers went to defendant's home
to arrest him for the rape of his mother-in-law. In the presence of defendant
and his wife, without giving Miranda's fourfold warning, the police asked if
Allen had raped the complainant. Denying the rape, Allen admitted having
had intercourse with her, but maintained that she had consented. He was then
arrested and taken to police headquarters. Supreme Court Judge Sobel, in
holding the incriminating statement inadmissible, found irrelevant that only a
single routine question was asked and held that the defendant had been questioned during a time when he was being deprived of his freedom in a significant
way. 3 The question was designed to elicit a response that might have incriminated him, and under these facts the Miranda warning was required.
Judge Sobel also found unimportant that the question was asked prior to
arrest, since "the defendant was not at such time free to go." 2 He interpreted
Miranda
28 Id. at 395, 207 N.E.2d at 360, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
29 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 495 (1966).
30 59 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
31 Id. at 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52. But see Duffy v. State, 243 Md. 425, 221 A.2d
653 (1966), where Miranda was held inapplicable to a suspect who was awakened by the
police and asked whether a knife that was protruding from beneath the mattress on which
he was lying was -the knife used in a stabbing. The suspect then made incriminating statements. The court held that the defendant was neither under arrest nor being restrained in
a significant way. He was merely accosted by the police, and such activity was not covered
by Miranda. Although the Maryland court failed to mention it, this case apparently was
tried before Miranda was decided; and if this be so, then under Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966), no warnings were required. One could not infer that Maryland was the
first and probably only state to make Miranda retroactive, since the court makes no mention
of the retroactivity problem. For an excellent analysis and exhaustive presentation of "custodial interrogation" under People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr.
169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965), see Graham, What Is "Custodial Interrogation"?:
California'sAnticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 59 (1966).
32 59 Misc. 2d 897, 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 259 '(Sup. Ct. 1966).

[Vol. 42:479]

POLICE INTERROGATION: WARNINGS AND WAIVERS

485

to hold that the mere "fact of custody" is inherently "compulsive" in its
Fifth Amendment sense, that as soon as a person is deprived of his "freedom
of action" adversary proceedings commence and the privilege [against selfincrimination] protects him from questioning, routine or otherwise, which
seeks to elicit a criminal [clue] or . .. factA'
In determining whether there is such "restraint" or "significant restraint" 4
that the interrogation can be said to be custodial, what criteria should be used
to determine whether there is in fact custodial interrogation outside the station
house? The relevant criteria are the place, the nature of the questioning, and the
effect on the suspect's mind, taking into consideration age, intelligence, experience,
and other pertinent data. This test is a subjective one because we are concerned
with the effect of the questioning in the suspect's mind. Compulsion for one
may not be compulsion for another. In this context, the policeman's intent to
arrest or whether he has sufficient probable cause to arrest is irrelevant.3 5
2. "Stop and Frisk" Laws
When a person's freedom of movement is restricted in a significant way,
the Mirandawarning must be given. Without such a warning a suspect may not
be questioned. This Supreme Court mandate raises serious doubts concerning
the constitutionality of the "stop and frisk" procedure. The New York Code
of Criminal Procedure, which is declaratory of the common-law rule,"8 provides:
A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place who he
reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit
a felony and
may demand of him, his name, address and explanation of
37
his action.
A fact situation will best illustrate the problem. X and Y, at 12:30 A.M.,
decided to go for something to eat in their neighborhood (a high crime rate
area). Before entering the restaurant, they looked through the windows and saw
several persons whom they did not particularly care for. Continuing down the
block, they had second thoughts and returned to the door. Without entering,
they finally decided to go elsewhere. Having observed their activity, two police
officers stopped them, and asked "What are you doing here?" Frightened, X and Y
vaguely explained their. activities. After continued police questioning both made
incriminating statements.
Under the Miranda guidelines only spontaneous statements "given . . .
33 Id. at 904, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
34 See note 14, supra.
35 Cf. People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1965), where
the court, in determining whether an interrogation took place, did not think "a determination
of the actual intent or the subjective purpose of the police in undertaking the interrogation"
was instructive in this regard, 400 P.2d at 102, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 206. Contra, People v. Allen,
50 Misc. 2d 897, 905, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 256-57 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
36 People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964). See
People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956). See' generally Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
37 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROc. § 180(a). Similar provisions can be found in Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (1953); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 41, § 98 (1966);
New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §- 594:2 (1955); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 12-7-1 (1956).
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voluntarily without any compelling influences"' are admissible in court. Any
response that X and Y made, in view of the fact that they were not free to leave,
was neither free from compulsion nor spontaneous in form. X and Y had been
deprived of their freedom of movement in a significant way; under the New
York statute they could not walk away from their interrogators, and the very
manner of stopping someone late at night had an element of compulsion.
A purpose of the "stop and frisk" procedure is to place the suspects in a
position to "readily ... exculpate [incriminate would be more accurate] themselves" 9 and avoid arrest. However, the questions and the attendant circumstances are designed to intimidate and elicit incriminating statements, despite
a suspect's absolute constitutional right to avoid them. Without the Miranda
warning being given at the commencement of the "stop and frisk" procedure,
it is submitted that any statement, even if it is exculpatory, will be inadmissible.
3.

Police Car Interrogation
Any interrogation in a police car without warning and waiver clearly violates
Miranda. The police car is an extension of the police station, whether a person
has been arrested or has been merely brought in for questioning. Furthermore, requiring a suspect to sit silently in a police car between two officers can
be classified only as intimidation and compulsion."0 Any statement obtained under
those conditions would be inadmissible under Miranda.
B. Necessity for Warning Despite Absence of Interrogation
Upon arrest, the police must immediately give the Miranda warning to the
suspect.41 The failure to do so will render inadmissible any statement subsequently
obtained. Let us consider another hypothetical case: B was arrested at his
apartment by two police officers. After placing him under arrest, one officer
searched the apartment while the other stayed with B. Finding nothing and
without saying anything, the two officers took him to their car and drove for
forty-five minutes, finally arriving at the station house. He was then left alone
in an interrogation room for two hours. Eventually, two police officers came
into the room; upon seeing them, B confessed. Nothing was ever said to B;
he was not interrogated. Under a narrow and restrictive reading of Miranda
then, no warning need have been given. However, the fact remains that the
atmosphere in which all this occurred was coercive, and there was a deliberate
attempt to compel a confession although not a single question was asked. Allowing the police to adopt this and similar methods of compulsion would exalt form
over substance and emasculate the Miranda guidelines. Any situation designed
to elicit a statement or admission violates the constitutional mandate of
Miranda."
38 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
39 People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 244, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 222
(1966).
40 See hypothetical under "Necessity for Warning Despite Absence of Interrogation,"
discussed in text accompanying notes 41, 42 infra.
41 This is apparently the instruction given by the California Attorney General to local

law enforcement officials. See Lynch, Interrogationof Criminal Defendants-Some Views on
Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAm L. REv. 221, 224 (1966).
42 Any police conduct, verbal or otherwise calculated to, expected to, or likely to
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If immediately upon arrest or detention the police inform a suspect of his
rights, the job of the police, district attorney, judges, and attorneys will be greatly
facilitated. Failure to inform can only result in court imposition of further limitations on police practices that might otherwise be constitutionally permissible.
C. "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine as Applied
to CustodialInterrogation
Chief Justice Warren in Miranda clearly indicated that "unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him." 43
(Emphasis added.) In Westover the defendant had been in the custody of the
local police for approximately fourteen hours, during which time he was subjected to extensive interrogation, although never informed of his rights. He
was then turned over to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who,
after warning him of his rights, pursued a new line of questioning in the same
headquarters. 4" The Supreme Court held his subsequent confession inadmissible
because the federal officers were the "beneficiaries of the pressure [previously]
applied by the local in-custody interrogation."45 Under these circumstances
there can be no assumption that the defendant had intelligently waived his
rights. In effect, the Court found the coercive atmosphere of the illegal interrogation to be the poisonous tree that yielded the fruit, the confession, secured by
the F.B.I. The Chief Justice stated, however, that
a different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody
by the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original

stimulate incriminating statements from one in custody would seem to fall within the term
"custodial interrogation." Remarks of Yale Kamisar at Escobedo- The Second Round Conference held at Ann Arbor, Michigan, July 23, 1966. Examples of such conduct are showing the
murder weapon, placing evidence of the crime in front of the suspect, or playing a tape of an
accomplice implicating the suspect. Cf. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 '(1963); People
v. Stoner, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2442 (CaL Jan. 26, 1967). Confronting the suspect with his
alleged accomplice or bringing in a member of the suspect's family is similar impermissible
conduct.
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
44 Id. at 494-95.
45 Id. at 497. Justice Clark, who dissented, wrote that "failure to follow the new procedures requires inexorably the exclusion of any statement by the accused, as well as the
fruits thereof." Id. at 500. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion also intimates that the fruits
of a Miranda violation must be excluded. Id. at 522. Justice White's dissenting opinion is
the only one of the four written opinions that appears to indicate the question remains an
open one. Id. at 545. In his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52 (1964), Justice White wrote: "A coerced confession is as revealing of leads as testimony
given in exchange for immunity and indeed is excluded in part because it is compelled
incrimination in violation of the privilege." Id. at 103. The concurrence goes on to discuss
how we determine what is or is not a fruit of the poisonous tree with the explicit assumption
that a coerced confession is such a tree. In view of his concurrence in Murphy and a close
reading of his dissent in Miranda, Justice White appears to be "leaving open" the "factual"
question of when subsequent evidence is actually the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
It is true, however, that the majority opinion does not specifically enunciate a derivative
evidence rule for confessions. See GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN
This same commentator maintains that such an important
CRImINAL CASES 123 (1966).
question cannot be said to have been decided in such a cursory manner and the question,
for the present at least, remains an open one. George, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants
-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. Rlv. 193 (1966).
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surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an
opportunity to exercise them.46
To put it another way, to be admissible the evidence must have been obtained
4
by means "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.1- 7
This "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been held applicable to
verbal or tangible evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest,48 illegal
detention49 or unlawful search and seizure.5" When a confession is obtained
without a prior warning or waiver, any evidence derived as a result of the compelled testimony, will be inadmissible in a court of law.5" Since the cornerstone
of Miranda is the privilege against self-incrimination, the independent-evidence
46 384 U.S. 436, 496.
47 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). See generally Broeder,
Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. Riv. 483 (1963).
48 Wong Sun v. United States, supra note 47, at 485.
49 Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1959), wherein the court discussed
the reason for the rule:
In these situations it is deemed a matter of overriding concern that effective sanctions be imposed against illegal arrest and detention and the risks of overreaching
inherent in such action. Even though highly probative and seemingly trustworthy
evidence is excluded in the process, this loss is thought to be more than counterbalanced by the salutary effect of a forthright and comprehensive rule that illegal
detention shall yield the prosecution no . . . advantage in building a case against
the accused. Id. at 467.
50 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). See generally HALL & KAmISAR, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 108-10 (2d ed. 1966).
51 See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947), where the Court wrote:
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter
what tihe inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical
disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag.
The secret is out for good.
In such a sense a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. Id. at 540.
If we end the discussion at this point, the proposition could stand. However, the Court
continued:
But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under
circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making
a usable one after those conditions have been removed. The Silverthorne and
Nardone cases . . . did not deal with confessions but with evidence of a quite
different category and do not control this question. Id. at 540-41.
The standard by which a second confession will be judged is whether the coercive
influences causing the initial involuntary confession have been removed or remain to make
the subsequent confession involuntary as well. Ibid. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). See generally Kamisar, Illegal Searches
or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements; a Dialogue on a Neglected Area
of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 98-105.
Some courts have held that an illegally obtained confession creates a rebuttable presumption that all "subsequent confessions are tainted by the continuing influence of the
first illegality." Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241. 249 (D.C. Cir. 1962), relying on
Leyra v. Denno, supra. The more recent decisions of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85
(1963) and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), although not dealing with
coerced confessions, lend support to a standard where the question is whether the defendant
would have confessed if there had been no illegality. This test leads inescapably to the
conclusion that an illegally obtained confession will always be the parent of a second confession. Of course, if an accused's lawyer is permitted to inform him that the first confession is inadmissible and cannot be used against him, a different result might follow. This
would be true only if the accused prior to any subsequent interrogation is given the Miranda
warning and his lawyer is present during such questioning.
Witnesses discovered as the result of an illegally obtained confession may or may not be
usable by the prosecution depending on the degree of "attenuation." Smith v. United States,
324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963). However, when a witness is discovered as the direct result
of an illegality, he will not be permitted to testify. People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d
997 (1942).
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test of Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n "2 appears applicable. The police wot~d,
therefore, have the, burden of establishing that "their evidence, is not tainted by
establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence," 3 namely, a source other than the confession or statement If the
police were permitted to utilize illegally obtained confessions for links and leads,
the Miranda guidelines would be of no value in protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination" because the police could then do indirectly what they cannot do directly.5 5 Whether the police might have eventually discovered the
evidence is irrelevant; the sole test is whether they have exploited the primary
illegality or obtained the evidence by means "sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint."5 " The derivative-evidence rule results in leaving
the suspect in substantially the, same position as if he had been advised of his
rights and had exercised his privilege against self-incrimination."'
D. Waiver Generally
In every interrogation, the critical question is whether there was an effective waiver. The principles governing waiver are these:
1. It has no application or effect until the suspect is in custody or his
freedom of movement is restrained in a significant way; 5"
2. It must
follow a clear and well-articulated fourfold warning as to his
9
rights;5
3. It must precede questioning (such questioning includes even the most
subtle invitation to speak)

;60

1 and
4. It must be an intelligent and understanding one;6
62

5. It may be withdrawn or renewed at any time.

A waiver will not be presumed from mere silence.' The testimony of a
police officer in conclusive terms that a waiver was given will be insufficient
to overcome the presumption against waiver.64 The prosecution's burden of
52
53

378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id. at 79 n.18.
54 See SOBEL, THE NFw CONFESSION STANDARMS "MIRANDA V. ARIZONA" 103 (1966);
Nedrud, The New Fifth Amendment Concept: Self-Incrimination Redefined, 2 NAT'L DIST.
ATT'yS Ass'N J. 113, 114 (1966). See generally Broeder, supra note 47; see Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDrAm L. Rnv.
199, 216-18 '(1966).
55 California's Supreme Court recognized this argument in applying the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to confessions obtained in violation of the requirements of People
v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937
(1965), which required the police to warn a suspect affirmatively of his right to counsel.
People v. Buchanan, 63 Cal. 2d 880, 409 P.2d 957, 48 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1966).
56 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 448 (1963).
57 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52: 77-80 (1964).
58 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
59 Id. at 467-73, 476.
60 Id. at 471 474.
61 Id. at 475.
62 Id. at 474, 479.
63 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
64 See GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 120
(1966). This author suggests there may even be a presumption of perjury on the part of
the police when they testify about warnings. In Carnley v. Cochran, supra note 63, the
Supreme Court in enunciating standards for judicial waiver stated: "The record must show,
or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel
but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." Id.
at 516. It thus becomes incumbent upon the police to have affirmative evidence that the
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proving an intelligent waiver is a heavy one,65 equivalent to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, if a lawyer is not present during the interrogation and there has been no intelligent waiver after the warning has been given,
no effective confession, admission, or other statement can result.
It seems virtually impossible, then, to find, much less prove, a waiver of
the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself and the right to have the
presence and assistance of counsel during the interrogation. As Mr. Justice Black
observed:
The doctrine of waiver seems to be a more palatable but equally effective
device for whittling away the protection afforded by the privilege ....
Of course, it has never been doubted that a constitutional right could be
intentionally relinquished . . . but we have said that intention to waive
the privilege against self-incrimination is not "lightly to be inferred."""
Miranda mandates that the individual must rationally and intelligently make
an election whether to incriminate himself and to abandon the right to the
presence of counsel. After a suspect has spoken to an attorney, no questioning
may take place without an attorney being present unless there is a waiver, and
an extensive interrogation before a statement is made will rebut any contention
that a claimed waiver was made knowingly. and intelligently."
There are considerable variations of the standard warning itself. Something like
I want you to understand that anything you say to us'will be on the record
and could be used against you, so if you want to talk to a lawyer first, get
his advice, we'll call anyone you want, or we'll get a lawyer for your
protection if you can't afford one
would not have the same effect as the terse "Anything-you-say-may-be-heldagainst-you-it's-your-constitutional-right-to-have-the-aid-of-c o u n s e I-and-invokeyour-privilege-against-self-incrimination-under - the - 5th - 6th - and - 14th - amendments." The warning must be clear and concise and convey to the suspect
exactly what he will surrender by waiving his rights.
In order to be waived, rights must be known. It appears that the only
admissible confession made after waiver will be one made with an understanding of the rights being waived, as well as the implications of waiving them, and
by a suspect who freely desires to confess. Since counsel is guaranteed for the

warning was given and the suspect affirmatively waived his rights. There need be no worry
over a "swearing" contest between the police and the suspect. The testimony of a police officer
unaccompanied by any corroborating evidence is insufficient per se to prove waiver.
Since we are dealing with the "voluntariness" of the waiver, it would appear that the
burden of proof would be the same required under the old "voluntariness test." Although
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1964), does not explicitly state what burden is on
the prosecution, apparently proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required. See People v.
Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
65 , Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
66 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
67 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). In addition any lengthy incommunicado incarceration is strong evidence of an invalid waiver. This may be the basis for
a McNabb-Mallory prompt arraignment concept in order to protect the individual further.
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purpose of protecting the defendant from his own ignorance,68 it is in a sense
illogical to allow him to relinquish a measure provided for his own protection.
Thus, there is always a strong, if not conclusive, presumption against waiver
unless there is an absence of "subverting factors" and the presence of a reasoned
and free choice. 9
Forgoing the privilege against self-incrimination can be the result of either
compulsion or waiver. The absence of compulsion, however, does not imply
the presence of waiver. The crucial question is whether the waiver was the
choice of a free will, was made without compulsion of any kind, and was made
"knowingly and intelligently.""0
It is obvious, therefore, that one question the courts face is whether, under
the circumstances, the particular person could have' competently and intelligently waived his rights. The characteristics of the person interrogated will be
a significant if not determinative factor in evaluating the effectiveness of the
waiver. Age, mentality, experience, education, language fluency, and health
should play crucial roles in determining whether the waiver was intelligent
and voluntary. In discussing the probability of a fifteen-year-old boy intelligently waiving his rights, the Supreme Court said:
But we are told that this boy was advised of his constitutional rights before
he signed the confession and that, knowing them, he nevertheless confessed. That assumes, however, that a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of that advice . . . . Moreover, we
cannot give any weight to recitals which merely formalize constitutional
requirements. 71 (Emphasis added.)
In dealing with a youth, the police would be wise to provide counsel immediately
or contact the child's parents and have them come to the station house. Of
course, the parents cannot waive their child's rights, and it is arguable that only
a lawyer or judge could adequately protect and inform a youthful suspect.
Merely giving the standard warning does not permit an inference that
the waiver was knowing and intelligent. The warning does not itself apprise
the suspect of the consequences, and without such knowledge the waiver cannot
be intelligent.72 The suspect can be informed of his rights most effectively by
someone versed in the law. Consequently, if the warning were .given by a
lawyer, the likelihood that the warning would be comprehensible to the suspect
would be increased. The giving of the warning and any interrogation subsequent to waiver should be preserved by videotape or magnetic tape. Whether
there is an intelligent and knowing waiver before interrogation begins can best
be determined by an impartial arbiter rather than by those doing the interro68 See People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-78- (1965).
69 Van Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 729 (1947) (Frankfurter, J. ,concurring).
70 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). Responding to interrogation does not
imply waiver, since the suspect may call a halt at hny time, id. at 474; nor does confessing
imply waiver. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Lack of'request to see an attorney
and lack of counsel after it has been offered do not imply waiver. Carnly v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
71 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
72 Those most likely to incriminate themselves, the indigent'and ignorant, ire the ones most
in need of counsel.
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gating. Thus, a warning issued by a magistrate also would be preferable to one
issued by a police officer.'"
Nor can an effective waiver be obtained by trickery and cajolery. As one's
ability to waive rights becomes more and more limited, the rights should be
more zealously guarded by courts against claims of waiver. Miranda demonstrates that it becomes almost impossible to have a binding waiver because (1)
it is not binding if the suspect can always change his mind and stop talking or
ask for a lawyer, and (2) the methods of showing that the alleged waiver was
not intelligent or informed are virtually limitless.
E. Retained Counsel and Waiver
An interesting situation suggests itself when a suspect is brought to police
headquarters and a lawyer retained by his parents arrives prior to any questioning. Assume that although the police give the standard warning, they deliberately
fail to inform the suspect of the lawyer's presence. The accused "waives" his
rights and, after interrogation, confesses. In speaking for the Miranda majority,
Chief Justice Warren asserted that where the police prevent an attorney from
consulting with his client, "independent of any other constitutional proscription,
this action constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance
of counsel and excludes any statement obtained in its wake."74 The failure to
advise a suspect that his family has retained a lawyer "contravenes the basic
dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights
of persons charged with crime,"" and it denies him sufficient information to
permit an intelligent and knowing waiver.
Assuming the suspect's lawyer (retained by his parents) had not arrived
until after the accused had "waived" his rights, must the police thereupon
inform him of the lawyer's arrival and abstain from or cease questioning him?
The answer to this question must be "yes" if we are to attribute any truly significant meaning to Miranda. A ritualistic warning is insufficient; 6 the accused
has a right to know all the circumstances affecting the relinquishment of his
rights. If the police do not inform the suspect of the presence of the attorney,
the waiver cannot be said to have been an intelligent and understanding one
since it was given without knowledge of all the relevant facts.
It may be argued, the language quoted from Miranda notwithstanding,7 7
that after a suspect has been emphatically and unequivocally advised of his
right to retained or appointed counsel and he still decides to speak, any
resulting confession is admissible even if the suspect has been denied consultation with his waiting attorney, whether the attorney's arrival at the scene of
interrogation was before, during, or after the warning. Underlying this argument are the assumptions that the police will give the requisite warnings clearly
73

If the suspect waives his rights, it might even be preferable for the magistrate to

question him in "open court" rather than return him to the ',backroom" for interrogation.

See Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
Mica. L. Rav. 1224 (1932).
74 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.35 (1966).
75 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 153, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841,

844 (1963).
76
77

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
See text accompanying note 74, supra.
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and unequivocally, and that the suspect will fully understand them. There is
an air of unreality to this, for
when we expect the police dutifully to notify a suspect of the very means
he may utilize to frustrate them-when we rely on them to advise a
suspect unbegrudgingly and unequivocally of the very rights he is being
counted on not to assert -we demand too much of even our best officers.78
There is no one better qualified than an attorney to advise a suspect of
his rights, for he is the one with the suspect's interests foremost in mind. Although
the lawyer does not have a constitutional right to consult with his client, the
requirements of substantial justice demand, at the very least, that in their warning the police inforn the accused that he has a lawyer outside who desires
to speak with him. "The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured
by the methods it uses in the, enforcement of its criminal law,""9 and the constitutional requirement of the assistance of counsel should be maximized rather
than minimized. Where is the logic in denying a lawyer the opportunity to warn
his client fully, unequivocally, and effectively of the consequences of police
questioning? If we are truly concerned that a trial not be a mere ritual after
conviction has been assured in the back room of the police station, where is the
logic in preventing an attorney, under any circumstances, from advising his client?
If the standard for waiver in the police station is as Miranda dictates, i.e., the
same as that required in the courtroom, how can the police in any way prevent
a suspect from consulting with his attorney? After all, if the attorney has the
obligation at the trial of fully discussing with, his client the possible consequences
of his taking the stand, does he not have the obligation at the station house of
discussing the possible consequences of his answering police interrogatories?
As the English experience . .. indicates, any rule which requires a caution
inevitably invites avoidance. . . . [Tjhe probable conflict of testimony about
whether a required caution was in fact given makes satisfactory judicial
enforcement doubtful. Any rule requiring a warning is also likely to be
ineffectual since the significance and effect of a, warning depend primarily
on emphasis and the spirit in which it is given. A warning can easily
become a meaningless ritual.s0
So long as the warning is given in the same coercive atmosphere where the
"voluntary" confession was obtained, the emphasis will shift to police handbooks
on how to obtain a "voluntary" waiver.'
78 Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JuSTIcE IN OUR TIME 35-36 (1965).

The constitution does not contemplate that prisoners shall be dependent upon
government agents for legal counsel and aid, however conscieltious and able those
agents may be. Undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are
prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which the
Sixth Amendment makes provision. Van Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26

(1947).

79 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 26 (1956).
80 Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical. 'View in PoLICE
POWER AN INDIVIDUALFREDOM 153, 175 (Sowle ed. 1962).
81 See Thompson, Detention After Arrest and In-Custody Investigation: Some Exclusionary Principles, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 390, 421.
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The question, then, is whether it is the "duty of the police to persuade the
suspect to talk or persuade him not to talk. They cannot be expected to do
both." Intimidation and coercion inhere in a police officer's badge, gun, and
uniform. Moreover, "can there be any doubt that many a 'subject' will assume
[even after he is told that they do not] that the police have a legal right to an
answer?""3 Failure to permit a retained lawyer to advise his client will make the
policy of warnings beneficial only to the literate, affluent, or sophisticated individual. Inherent intimidation will remain, because the usual suspect, especially
the illiterate or non-English-speaking individual, is so frightened and confused
that he cannot fully comprehend the police warnings. Indeed, one of the most
active spokesmen for the prosecution-oriented community has recognized "the
improbability, if not impossibility of an intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amend' 84
ment privilege.
One of the more subtle ways to mislead the suspect is to inform him that
if he agrees to speak he may stop the questioning at any time. The consequence
of such an addition is to reduce the overall effectiveness of the required warnings
by encouraging waiver. The warning should be as neutral as possible, and if
the police are truly concerned that the suspect may be unaware that he may

halt any interrogation, let this warning be given after an affirmative waiver
when the suspect is ready to answer questions. There is a possibility that, even
after invocation of the privilege, the police may attempt to subvert the suspect's
decision to remain silent.

It has been suggested by a most unlikely source that, despite the language
in Miranda clearly indicating an independent constitutional violation when retained counsel is denied access to his client, 5 the police need not permit a
suspect to consult with his lawyer if they themselves advise the suspect in accordance with the Miranda requirements. 6 Professor Kamisar argues that,
although the Court was aware of the contention that a person in police custody
should not be able to waive his constitutional rights without the presence of
counsel because the party alleging waiver has control of the party alleged to
have waived, the rules it prescribed do permit such waiver in the absence of
counsel.8 7 According to Kamisar, to read the language in the Court's footnote
358 as granting the lawyer retained by friends or relations (not by the suspect
himself) an absolute, automatic right to see his "client" who has not asked for a
lawyer and is unaware that he even has one is to prevent such suspects from
82 Brief of Edward L. Barrett, Jr. as Amicus Curiae, p. 9, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d
338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (on rehearing).
83 Kamisar, op. cit. supra note 78, at 31.
84 Kuh, Developments in Criminal Law -Problems of Police Interrogation, in PROCEEDINGS,

CONFERENCE OF

STATE

GOVERNMENTS

51

(Council

of State Gov'ts

1966).

This

was a speech delivered at the Conference of Chief Justices held in Montreal, Canada, Aug.
3-6, 1966 (on file at the University of Michigan Law Library).
85 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.35 (1966).
86 Kamisar, Miranda v. Arizona: Some Comments on the Old New Fifth Amendment,
in PROCEEDmNGS, op. cit. supra note 84, at 47.
87 Ibid.
88
The police also prevented the attorney [in Escobedo] from consulting with his client.
Independent of any other constitutional proscription, this action constitutes a violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel and excludes any statement obtained in its wake. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.35 (1966).
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waiving their rights in the absence of counsel and is, in effect, to say that the
"realities" of police station proceedings are such that the Miranda warnings alone
do not provide adequate protection if issued by police officers. But, as Professor
Kamisar interprets Miranda, rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court is, for now
at any rate, operating on the premise that these warnings can provide adequate
protection, even though issued by police officers."'
If confidence in police-issued Miranda warnings is unwarranted, then,
reasons Kanisar, every suspect, not only the suspect who is well connected or
fortunate enough to have friends or relatives who rush a lawyer down to the
station house, should be entitled to the presence and advice of counsel in order
to decide whether to waive counsel and his "right to remain silent." At this
point, however, footnote 35 threatens to engulf the whole opinion; for as he
reads Miranda, it permits the police to obtain incriminating statements from
duly warned suspects who "want to get it off their chest," but whose lawyers
would often persuade them to "keep it inside."
As the authors see it, to couch the problem in terms of the right of an
attorney to consult with his client is misleading. Rather, the question is whether
a suspect whose family has obtained counsel is entitled to be informed of this
fact before a knowing and intelligent waiver can be made? Even assuming a
valid "waiver" has occurred before counsel reaches the station house, are the
police, after commencing an interrogation, obliged to inform the suspect that
a lawyer retained by his family is outside and wishes to speak with him? To
these questions footnote 35 and the sixth amendment provide the answer and it
is yes!
Thus we are offered the rule of construction, that where a broad maxim
is urged on the Court but it adopts a "narrow view" (assuming one can seriously
argue that requiring the appointment of counsel at the interrogation stage is a
narrow view), then until further word from the Court the police are entitled
to operate on the premise that there has been a rejection of the more encompassing maxim. Although there is some validity to what has been suggested,
the emanations from the majority opinion are not as hazy as some would have
us believe.' Throughout the opinion the Court was concerned with the fifth
amendments privilege against self-incrimination, and the rules it enunciated
are designed to inform the suspect of this privilege. When we speak of an
attorney being present at the station house to consult with his client, we are
89 But why shouldn't the footnote be taken for what it clearly says? For however general
or vague some of the language of the Court is in certain places, one would have -to say that
Miranda was a very carefully considered opinion. For example, the majority opinion cites
Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928),
but Chief Justice Warren is very careful to indicate that the citation of Justice Brandeis is
not to be construed as passing on the merits of Olmstead. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note
88, at 480 n.49.
90 Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 88, at 465 n.35 (1966). The footnote clearly governs
a specific situation, and for it to be viewed as unfortunate or merely dicta is to take a narrow
and restrictive approach to an opinion that is no way narrow and restrictive. Such a reading
is similar to state courts' reading of Escobedo, Rothblatt,. Poliae Interrogation and the Right

to Counsel, Post Escobedo v. Illinois: Application v. Emasculation, 17 HASTiNoS L.J. 41
(1965), a course which resulted in much confusion and directly contributed to the new and
broad constitutional mandate of Miranda. For a discussion of why the footnote means what
it says, sne text supra and accompanying notes 86-89.
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concerned with the sixth amendment's right to counsel. Nowhere does the
majority opinion discuss the sixth amendment independently of the fifth, except
when the opinion asserts that, where the police prevent an attorney from consulting with his client, this action "independent of any other constitutional
proscription . . . constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel."'" (Emphasis added.) Thus, the Court clearly indicated
that, regardless of any other methods necessary to protect the fifth amendment
privilege, when the police prevent consultation there is an independent sixth
amendment violation.9"
What of the individual who is not fortunate or sophisticated enough to
retain counsel in advance or whose family has neither the money nor the opportunity to do so for him? Are we to cease construction on the road that Gideon
94
Griffin v. California,95 and Miranda
v. Wainwright,9 Douglas v. California,
have begun? Are we now to accept the view that there is no constitutional or
moral obligation to supply a lawyer to give a truly effective warning? Or are
we to succumb to a new line of reasoning that the fortunate individual should
be denied his lawyer's warning because, if we permit that warning, the state
will have to siipply a lawyer to inform the unfortunate suspect? It is difficult to
believe that anyone could seriously argue that to effectuate equal justice under
law we must restrict rather than expand the scope of constitutional rights.
The mandate of the sixth amendment provides for the effective assistance
of counsel. The Supreme Court uses this right of counsel to implement the fifth
amendment's protection against self-incrimination. Effective assistance of counsel requires nothing less than a retained lawyer being permitted to advise his
client. It is submitted that this is the only realistic interpretation of what may
become one of the most discussed footnotes in the history of the law. Once the
affluent are guaranteed a warning by their own counsel, the "denial of counsel
to the indigent. . -. while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one
would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation . . .
9 and now Miranda v.
in Gideon v. Wainwright, . . . Douglas v. California""
Arizona.
IV. Conclusion
The results of Miranda can lead only to better law enforcement procedures,
not the "handcuffing of the police."9 " The suspect is either innocent, guilty, or
91
92

Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 88, at 465 n.35.
Ibid.

93 372 U.S.
94 372 U.S.
95 380 U.S.
96 Miranda

335 (1963).
353 (1963).
609 (1965).
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966).

97 In a post-Miranda survey of more than 1,000 cases in which the accused had made
an incriminating statement, Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle Younger indicated that
the percentage of cases in which confessions or admissions were made have not decreased, as
might have been anticipated, because of the increased scope of the admonition required by
Miranda. Office of the District Attorney, County of Los Angeles, Dorado-Miranda Survey
(Aug. 4, 1966), reported in N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1966, p. 20, col. 3, reprinted at 35 FO"aHAM
L. Rev. 255 (1966). New York's experience with the warnings is subject to conflicting
interpretations. The commanding officer of one Manhattan detective squad reported that
"by and large .. . [suspects] readily admit what they've been doing even after they've been
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in some way connected with the crime. Of course, if he is guilty or in circumstances in which he is likely to incriminate himself,9" "any lawyer worth his salt
will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under
any circumstances." 99 Nevertheless, with the accused's consent, an attorney is
not prevented from furnishing information valuable in apprehending others.
Even if no information is furnished, the police are still in a position to gather
independent evidence of the suspect's guilt.
If the suspect is innocent and can readily explain his position, the lawyer
would and should encourage him to cooperate with the police to explain his
If the explanation is accepted, an innocent man will be out of
innocence."
the criminal process as early as possible. If the individual is guilty or might
easily incriminate himself, but there is a likelihocd that extraconfessionalevidence
will still convict him, the lawyer may well instruct him to confess in order to
get more favorable treatment. If the individual is guilty or was in incriminating
circumstances, but cannot be convicted aside from "his own mouth," of course,
the very purpose of
he will be told not to speak; but that advice implements
10
'
about.
all
is
Miranda
what
is
That
amendment.
fifth
the
There are several options available to law enforcement officers. They can
attempt to circumvent, emasculate, or ignore the constitutional mandates of
Miranda 2 On the other hand, full and genuine compliance with the enunciated rules can serve both to enhance respect for the law and police officers and
to strengthen and facilitate law enforcement throughout the United States.
Respect for law, which is a fundamental prerequisite of law enforcement,
can hardly be expected of the people if the officers charged with its enforcement do not set the example of obedience to its precepts' 0 3 If they fail, the
resulting alienation of the public would lead to a lack of cooperation. In a
democratic society the police must conduct themselves in accordance with the
requirements of human dignity and individual freedom. We are in the midst
of a second American Revolution where
our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.... To declare that in the

told of their rights." N.Y. Times, June 25, 1966, § 1, p. 1, col. 6. Another detective squad

commander indicated that Miranda had "not weakened law enforcement." N.Y. Times, Aug.
13, 1966, p. 1, col. 1. Nevertheless, Brooklyn District Attorney Aaron Koota claimed that
the new rules had "shackled" law enforcement, ibid., and that there was a sharp increase of
refusals to speak after Miranda. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 17, col. 1.
98 See GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 9-15 (1955).
99

Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949)

in part).

(Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting

Counsel present will tend to ensure that the accused has a real opportunity, if he
so desires, to tell his story effectively and to eliminate distortions and ambiguities.
In short, counsel can aid in examining the accused so that his story comes out as
he aims to tell it as well as protecting him from unrestrained cross-examination ....
Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae (in Miranda, Westover, Vignera and Stewart), p. 23.
100

See also Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO
ST. L.J. 449 (1964).
101 See GIswoLD, op. cit. supra note 98, at 9-18.

102 For a discussion of court interpretations attempting to limit the scope of Escobedo, see
Rothblatt, supra note 90.
103

See Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 13, 28 (1964).
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administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means . . . would
bring terrible retribution. 104
Only through the scrupulous observance of constitutional rights of citizens and
the mutual cooperation of law enforcement officials and defense attorneys can
our system of criminal justice provide effective law enforcement and at the
same time preserve human rights and dignity.

104

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)

(Brandeis, J., dissenting).

